PHIL 341: Continental Philosophers: Heidegger
Exam 2 Review: Martin Heidegger: Being and Time, §§25-44

IV. BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AS BEING-WITH AND BEING-ONE’S SELF. THE “THEY”.

1. Be able to define and make sense of “equiprimordial.”


1. Heidegger knows that the usual philosophical answer to the question, Who? is the “I” (ego), the “self,” “subject,” or “conscience.” These concepts have indicated what maintains itself as identical in all the changes of its experiences.
   a. How does Heidegger’s criticize these ways of understanding the “who” of Dasein?
   b. Instead of these approaches, where does Heidegger intend to look for the “who” of Dasein? (The answer here has been his procedure all along).


1. How were “others” already disclosed in the analysis of the “worldhood of the world”?  
2. Dasein encounters entities of which it must say: “they are there too and there with” (154).
   a. Explain this terminology.
   b. Why does “others” does not mean “everybody else but me”?
3. How are Others first encountered by Dasein—and how are they not first encountered (156)?
   a. Heidegger says (156) “plainly” Dasein is “in the first instance”…unrelated to Others but can later on develop relations with others. How are we to take this statement?
   b. “Being alone” is a mode of Being-with. Explain.
   c. Distinguish between Being-with and Dasein-with.
4. Why does solicitude or caring for... better interpret the meaning of Being-with than concern?
   a. What are some of the everyday, deficient modes of solicitude? Explain why they are still forms of solicitude.
   b. Leaping in “is to a large extent determinative for Being with one another, and pertains for the most part to our concern with the ready-to-hand.... [Leaping ahead] pertains essentially to authentic care—that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a “that with which he is concerned” (158-9). Explain this contrast more fully, dealing especially with the underlined phrases.
5. What does Heidegger mean by considerateness (respect) and forbearance? To what are they analogous in the ontology of Dasein’s dwelling in the world (back in chapter 3)?
6. “Because Dasein’s Being is Being-with, its understanding of Being implies [an] understanding of Others” (161, top). Explain this claim, especially what is meant by “an understanding of Others.”
   a. Is the other as a person understood on the basis of one’s understanding of oneself?
   b. Why is Being-with not first created by an experience of empathy? (161-3)

§ 27. Everyday Being-one’s-Self and the “They”

1. What does Heidegger mean by distantiality? With what is it primarily concerned? (163-4) (NB. Distantiality does not mean that I am aloof or cold to the other, although this could end up being a reaction to the primordial phenomenon of distantiality.)
2. “Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in subjection to Others” (164).
   a. Be able to give examples of how the “they” operates to “make an issue of” averageness (164-5).
   b. The “they” disburdens Dasein: what does this mean? Disburdened of what?
   c. “Everyone is the other, and no one is himself [or herself]” (165). Explain.
3. “Dasein is for the sake of the ‘they’ in an everyday manner, and the ‘they’ articulates the referential context of significance” (167). Noting the underlined phrases, say what implications this statement has for Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world.”
   a. “In terms of the ‘they’ and as the ‘they, I am ‘given’ proximally to ‘myself’” (167). What does this say about self-understanding?
   b. If this is true, how is Dasein able to accomplish an kind of authentic way of Being itself? How is this related to the “they”? (167-8)

V. Being-in as Such

§28. The Task of a Thematic Analysis of Being-in
2. Dasein is in such a way as to be its there (171). What does this mean? How does it differ from “being in some location”? 
   a. Explain this in terms of disclosure.
   b. How does Heidegger relate this phenomenon to the usual philosophical metaphor of the “natural light” that humans are supposedly endowed with? (171)

A. The Existential Constitution of the “There”

§29. Being there [Da-sein] as a State-of-mind
1. What is the relation between “state-of-mind” and “mood”? 
   a. The German term for “state-of-mind” [Befindlichkeit] contains the same root as the English word “find” (see note 2, p. 172). Can you use this to help clarify what is important about mood?
   b. When and how does Dasein find itself “in a mood”? Explain. Give examples.
   c. Why is it appropriate to talk about being “in” a mood instead of a mood being in us? (This comes more from our discussion than directly from the text, but you should be able to explain it in terms of what Heidegger says about mood).
   d. Why can Dasein not know why it has moods?
2. What does Heidegger mean by “thrownness” and how is this related to mood/state-of-mind? (NB: this is the first “essential characteristic” of states-of-mind.)
   a. Connect thrownness to facticity.
   b. What is the “evasive turning-away” involved in states-of-mind?
3. A mood assails Dasein. Explain. What is important about this?
   a. How is this connected to the “second essential characteristic of states-of-mind”?
   b. What is the third essential characteristic of states-of-mind? (176-7)
   c. Note the summary paragraph at the bottom of p. 178 (last complete ¶).

§30. Fear as a Mode of State-of-Mind.
1. This section is largely a concrete working-out of what Heidegger discussed already generally in the previous section on mood. You do not need to trace the particulars of Heidegger’s analysis of the example of fear.
2. What is most important here is: 
   a. how this works as an example of mood,
   b. how it sets the stage for the contrast that establishes anxiety as the most revelatory mood of Dasein’s existence.
§31. Dasein as Understanding.

1. How are understanding and mood linked?
   a. What is the relation between cognitive understanding and the kind of understanding that Heidegger is discussing in this section?
2. Be able to explain how understanding is related to “competence” (183).
   a. How is Dasein “competent” with regard to this foundational understanding?
   b. How is the understanding a “disclosive potentiality-for-Being”?
   c. It’s not that “there are” possibilities and Dasein either understands them or it doesn’t. Rather, it is because Dasein is itself Being-possible-as-understanding that there “are” possibilities at all. Be able to explain this.
3. Relate projection to Dasein’s understanding. Explain what projection is, what it projects, and how it does this.
   a. “Dasein is constantly ‘more’ than it factually is..., but Dasein is never more than it factically is, for to its facticity its potentiality-for-Being belongs essentially” (185). Explain what this means.
   b. Why is Dasein also “never anything less” that its “Being-possible”? Relate this to the “not yet.” How can both these statements (a & b) be true?
4. How does Heidegger differentiate authentic from inauthentic understanding (186)?
5. Note the “sight” related to “understanding” on the bottom of p. 186. I’m not sure we covered this in much detail, though we did talk about “transparency” as the sight that sees Dasein’s Self through all the constitutive elements of Being-in-the-world. This implies that the “Self” is not an “internal point” but spread through all of Being-in-the-world.
   a. Understanding’s “sight” here recalled as the sight (circumspection) that sees entities within-the-world in concernful circumspection, and to the sight (respect or considerateness and forbearance or “looking after”) that sees the Dasein-with of others in solicitude (care for).
   b. Heidegger names the understanding’s sight that is related to existence transparency (in German, Durchsichtigkeit, or “seeing-throughness”).
6. The ¶ at the very bottom of 187 and the next ¶ function as a summary of this section.

§32. Understanding and Interpretation

1. What is the relationship of interpretation to understanding? [This basically comes in the 1st ¶ on 188).
2. Know the “taking-as” structure of all interpretation
   a. How does the “circumspective concern” of Being-in-the-world already illustrate this “as structure” of interpretation?
   b. How is “articulation” related to interpretation?
   c. Does interpretation begin when we start to make statements or assertions about entities? Explain.
   d. Is “pure seeing” or “pure perception” of an object a necessary step on the way to interpretation? (189-91)
3. You do not have to do much with the “fore-”structure of interpretation and understanding: fore-having, foresight and “fore-conception” (191), except to note that they are part of the structure of understanding’s projection.
4. Strictly speaking, only Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless. Explain, including what “meaning” signifies here for Heidegger.
5. Why does circularity of reasoning not invalidate interpretation (194-5)?

§33. Assertion as a Derivative Mode of Interpretation. [skip]
§ 34. Being-there and Discourse. Language.

1. Know that discourse and talk are one and the same thing (translations of the same German word).
2. If Being-in-the-World understands itself and its world in terms of possibilities of its Being, this understanding as a whole is called intelligibility. What is the relation of intelligibility to discourse?
3. Explain how the following are elements of discourse:
   a. what is talked about;
   b. what is said in the talk;
   c. the communication;
      1) (Why is communication not primarily a transfer of information?)
   d. the “making known.”
4. How does discourse bring us back to Being-with and Dasein-with?
5. “Hearing is constitutive for discourse. ... Dasein hears, because it understands” (206). Explain both statements.
6. Heidegger says we almost never hear pure noise. Why not? In other words, why is it significant that what we hear is the wind in the pines, the cries of the children at play, the creak of the floorboards? How is this related to language/discourse? {Hint—how is it related to articulated understanding?}
7. Why is keeping silent an essential possibility of discourse? (208)
8. How is discourse constitutive of the Being of the there? (208)
9. What is Heidegger’s revision of the traditional definition of “man” [the human] as “the rational animal”?

B. The Everyday Being of the ‘There’ and the Falling of Dasein.

In these sections, be able to talk about each phenomenon as an “everyday” mode of the existential structures of Dasein’s “Being-in”-the-World. Be able to explain them using examples and say how they are related to the everyday Who? of Dasein.

§ 35. Idle Talk

1. Be able to describe how idle talk works. What is the specific character of “idle talk” that distinguishes it within the realm of discourse/talk? Be able to explain a few other words for “idle talk”—e.g., “the talk of the town,” “the word on the street,” etc.
2. How is idle talk more concerned with “what is said in the talk” than “what is talked about”?
3. Why does idle talk lead to “uprootedness” and a “closing off” instead of disclosure?
4. Why can’t we ever get rid of or extract ourselves from idle talk?

§ 36. Curiosity.

1. What is characteristic about curiosity’s “desire to see or perceive”?
2. Why doesn’t curiosity in Heidegger’s sense bring authentic insight and knowledge?
3. Know how the German word for curiosity, Neugier, is constructed—what it literally means helps us understand why curiosity is so fast-paced and leads to distraction.
4. Why is curiosity “everywhere and nowhere” (217)?

§ 37. Ambiguity.

1. What is the root meaning of ambiguity (as a word).
2. Explain this root meaning in terms of the “everyday” mode of understanding that ambiguity represents for Heidegger.
3. How is ambiguity related to idle talk?
4. How does ambiguity affect everyday Being-with (219)?

§38. Falling and Thrownness.
1. What is basically meant by “falling”? What is not meant by “fallen” (short middle paragraph on 220/H176).
2. If you understand the middle ¶ on p. 221 (right at H177), you understand the core of the whole chapter.
3. What is tempting in falling? (221)
4. Relate tranquilization to falling (222).
5. Why is falling “alienating”? Does it feel alienating? (222)
6. Note the ¶ on 223 (H179) where Heidegger relates falling to thrownness (facticity). How does falling extend or further Dasein’s thrownness?

VI. CARE AS THE BEING OF DASEIN

§39. The Question of the Primordial Totality of Dasein’s Structural Whole.
1. Note first the excellent summary on the bottom of p. 225. This last ¶ is a condensation of almost every crucial idea in the development so far. You could never understand it without the foregoing articulation, but this review should serve to call much of that detail to mind.

§40. The Basic State of Anxiety as a Distinctive Way in which Dasein is Disclosed.
1. How does Dasein flee in anxiety? How is there disclosure this fleeing?
2. How is Anxiety fundamentally different than Fear?
3. Anxiety is anxious about “nothing ready-to-hand” (231-2). What does this tell us about anxiety?
4. Good summary ¶ on 233, italicized sentence. Why is it significant that what Dasein is anxious in the face of is the same thing that Dasein is anxious about?
5. What is the meaning of “uncanniness” and how is it related to anxiety?
   a. How is uncanniness related to Being-in-the-World?
   b. How is uncanniness related to tranquilized familiarity of falling?

§41. Dasein’s Being as Care.
2. Where is Dasein when it is ahead of itself? (236)
3. “To put it otherwise, existing is always factual” (236, bottom). Relate existing and factual to the two things that were just said about care (1 & 2).
4. What is the 3rd element of care?
5. Look at the two summary ¶s on 237. Use these ¶¶ to say why care embraces Dasein’s Being (Being-in-the-World) as a whole.
6. Don’t need to worry about “Being free” or the derivative modes of ‘care’: willing & wishing, addiction & urge.

§42. Confirmation of the Existential Interpretation of Dasein as Care in terms of Dasein’s Pre-Ontological Way of Interpreting Itself.
1. This should not be difficult if you understand care itself. It is in fact a “confirmation” or testimony of what Heidegger has just laid out: existentially/ontologically.
§ 43. Dasein, Worldhood, Reality.
Not needed at all for test, but, short and sweet: To traditional philosophy, the “proof” of the “external world” is a recurring problem, as one sees in Descartes; the lack of an indisputable solution to it was called by Immanuel Kant “the scandal of philosophy.” But Heidegger argues that, in the analysis of Dasein as “Being-in-the-world,” there is no “externality” to the world. Dasein is from the first out in the world.

§ 44. Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth. [Not needed for exam]
1. What is the “traditional conception of truth”?
2. What problems does Heidegger discover in trying to say exactly in what “truth” consists when some statement/ assertion is “true”?
3. What role does “demonstration” play in Heidegger’s phenomenological approach to understanding truth? Use an example to explain.
   a. How does language phenomenologically relate us to things? (What kind of “Being-relation” with regard to things does Dasein draw us into?
   b. In this phenomenological experiment (of demonstrating the truth of an assertion), how do we learn that language is primarily not a “representation of reality”?
   c. What does the confirmation/ demonstration of truth consist in, according to Heidegger (261)?
4. What is the fundamental character of “being true” according to Heidegger?
   a. Relate what he emphasizes to the original Greek word for truth: a-letheia.
5. “What is primarily true…is Dasein” (263). Explain. Your explanation should be able to embrace our whole understanding of Dasein as Being-in-the-World, as worked out in Division I of the Book.
   a. Dasein is “in the truth” (263). What does this not mean?
   b. What does it mean, and how does it include the notion that Dasein is also “in untruth”?
   c. Note the 4 points on 264, which trace Dasein’s Being-in-truth through disclosedness, thrownness, projection, and falling.