Economics 374-01A Dr. John F. Olson
Monetary Theory and Policy Spring 2008
Study Guide for Third Test
The third test is scheduled for Wednesday, May 7th from 6:00pm to 8:00pm (although you should not need the entire two hours). As the third test, it includes the adjusted/revised material from Units Four and Five: Chapters 2 (re-read/reviewed), 13, 14, & 11 from Handa; the hyper-linked documents from the FRS and SF FRB from the course web-page; and the St. Louis FRB article by Gilbert. The bulleted points below are from the end of the chapter “Summary of Critical Conclusions” in Handa. See/study the appropriate chapter sections of the text for details. I have inserted annotations (and some potential test questions in italics).
Chapter 2 – Money and Prices (reviewed as foundation for material in Chapters 13 & 14)
This assertion is the neutrality of money. You should be able to discuss the
perspectives of Fisher, the
The QTM disequilibrium changes are, of course, short-run adjustment
processes in moving to the new long-run equilibrium.
Explain the different concepts or views of the transmission mechanism
(see the final two bulleted conclusions below).
Present and explain the economic reasoning underlying each of the three
Keynesian motives for holding money.
Recall that the classical view assumes there is no money illusion and,
thus, there is the classical dichotomy between the real (commodity markets) and
nominal (money) economies. Money is
primarily a transactions asset with few or no good substitutes. The Keynesian assumptions are contrasting
views of the nature of money and its role in the economy.
Chapter 13 – Neoclassical and Classical Models
In this chapter and
the next (14), you are presented with the evolution of macroeconomic thinking
over the past two or more centuries. I
suggest using a compare/contrast approach in studying the material. What is common among the models in their
assumptions about structure and behavior?
What is different? And how does
that yield similar or different conclusions?
There is also the
development and presentation of the IS-LM and AD-AS model(s) with which you
should be familiar from ECON 333 (Macroeconomic Theory). You should be able to use these tools to
appropriately illustrate your macroeconomic arguments. While the graphs and/or equations are useful
illustrative and/or analytical devices, what is most important are the
underlying economic (conceptual) arguments.
Keynes and his
subsequent followers had different assumptions about the structure and processes
of the macro-economy than the classical and neo-classical approaches; thus,
they reach different conclusions and results.
The IS curve
represents goods market equilibrium, while the LM curve represents money market
equilibrium. (Note: by invoking Walras’
Law, goods market equilibrium simultaneously implies credit –
savings/investment – market equilibrium, and money market equilibrium
simultaneously implies bond market equilibrium.) Combining IS and LM conditions creates an AD
(aggregate demand) curve – a negatively-sloped relationship between the price
level and level of real expenditure (income, GDP demanded) in the economy. To complete the model, an AS (aggregate
supply) curve is constructed to represent the supply-side (factor market equilibrium)
of the economy. Just as there are
differences in views (assumptions) about how the demand-side of the economy
should be modeled, there are differences about the supply-side. An essential difference (although not the
only one) between the Classical (& neo-classical) view and the Keynesian
view is the ability (and/or speed) of wages and prices to adjust to market-clearing
levels, thus restoring equilibrium.
Why is this the case; that is, what
assumptions and reasoning lead to these conclusions? What do flexible prices and wages, the extent
or degree of market competition, and the absence of money illusion have to do
with this?
The natural rate of unemployment exists because of normal amounts of
frictional and structural unemployment – these can change over the long-run as
the demographic composition of the labor force changes, the structure of the
labor market and labor search changes, and as the structural composition of
labor demand and supply change.
Why is the quantity of money neutral; that is, what assumptions and
reasoning lead to these conclusions? See
immediately above as well as in Chapter 2 – pure QTM! The implication is that in the long-run,
monetary policy can only affect the price level and the rate of inflation.
Is this “disequilibrium” state just the adjustment phase of going from
one long-run equilibrium to another?
Why and/or how might monetary policy speed the recovery or adjustment to
equilibrium?
Section 13.18 discusses the distinguishing features among the different
(and evolving) views with the Classical paradigm, while section 13.19
elaborates the Monetarist view. What is
it in (the assumptions of) the modern classical and new classical approaches
vs. those of traditional classical, neo-classical, and monetarists that creates
the difference regarding the neutrality or non-neutrality of money?
The theory of Ricardian equivalence is addressed in section 13.17 – this
is the proposition that the effects on nominal income of debt-financed vs.
tax-financed increases in government expenditures are the same. The proposition largely rests on the
recognition by households that debt-financing is merely postponing a subsequent
increase in taxes. Thus, with an
increase in current taxes, households reduce their current consumption to pay
the current taxes or with debt-financing, households increase their saving (and
reduce current consumption) to pay future taxes.
Chapter 14 – Keynesian and Neo-Keynesian Approaches
Keynes and his
subsequent followers had different assumptions about the structure and
processes of the macro-economy than the classical and neo-classical approaches;
thus, they reach different conclusions and results.
The Phillips’ curve is, of course, the inverse relationship between the
inflation rate and unemployment rate.
The classical and neo-classical views hold that such a relationship
might exist only in the short-run; in the long-run the Phillips’ curve is
vertical. Why?
Hence, the inflation-expectations augmented short-run Phillips’ curve can
be derived and applied. Explain how
inflation-expectations can shift the short-run Phillips’ curve, yet still
result in a vertical long-run Phillips’ curve (when expectations = actual
experience).
Recall how the Walrasian view (classical and
neo-classical) assumes the dominance of competition, flexible wages and prices,
and the absence of money illusion. How
does the Keynesian view differ? What
about the modern or new classical approaches?
Why not – that is, why don’t these rational dynamic responses take the
economy to full employment (or within an acceptable period)? What prevents full-employment equilibrium
from being restored?
Notice here that Handa is presenting and
discussing a long-run view – how does this neo-Keynesian view differ from a
neo-classical view in not only the assumptions, but also the conclusions?
What is Ricardian equivalence? (See Handa
13.17 and above.)
What is the spirit of Keynes’ General Theory, Keynesian analyses, and
their policy conclusions? How do these
compare with the “spirit” of classical, neo-classical, monetarist, modern
classical, and/or new classical views?
What specifically accounts for the difference(s) or similarity?
Chapter 11 – The Central Bank: Goals, Tools and Guides
for Monetary Policy
Because the FED has
only the ability to influence (and not directly control) the money supply
through the use of its policy tools, the policy process is a bit more complex
than heretofore presented. The FED uses
its policy tools to directly affect operating target variables which, in turn,
affect intermediate target variables which are then related to the ultimate
policy goal variables. This requires
setting policy goals, understanding and applying the theoretical and empirical
relationships among the goal, intermediate, and operating variables, and
appropriately using the policy tools.
As well, one should see that the macroeconomic
processes are affected by many things outside of the FED’s
control – which can make policy-making very difficult. And there is, of course, the problem of
“politics” in a democratic society where priorities in goal-setting can be
quite contentious.
· Historically, most central banks have had the mandate to pursue a number of macroeconomic goals, including price stability, low unemployment, high growth, etc. Achievement of multiple goals is only possible if the economy allows such a possibility and the policy maker has enough policy tools.
That is, to achieve
multiple goals either the goals need to be consistent with each other and/or
you need to have a sufficient number of policy tools to achieve the multiple
goals (at least one tool per goal). The
FED really has only one tool – an ability to affect the supply of reserves
through either open market operations or the discount rate. Other concerns or requirements are that the
variables subject to the policy goals need to be measurable in a timely manner,
as well as have a theoretical and empirical relationship to the FED’s tools or instruments.
Further, because the goal variables are likely to be influenced by other
macroeconomic phenomena, the FED has to know (predict?) and account for effects
these other forces will have.
· In the 1960s and early 1970s, economic theory implied, and most central banks attempted to achieve, a tradeoff based on the Phillips curve between unemployment and inflation. This tradeoff proved to be unstable for policy and was abandoned by the 1980s.
There were multiple
problems with this strategy. It presumed
the Phillips’ curve trade-off (inverse relationship between unemployment and
inflation) was a long-run relationship.
More recent theory and evidence establishes that the long-run Phillips’
curve is vertical; that is, there is no trade-off. Further, attempts to push the unemployment
rate below the natural rate create an accelerating rate of inflation; thus, as
the natural rate of unemployment began to rise during the 1970s, the policies
to reduce the actual unemployment rate had a bias to create additional
inflation. As well, the underlying
macroeconomic model of the period assumed the business cycle phenomena were the
result of AD curve shifts – the primary exogenous macroeconomic disturbances of
the 1970s are perhaps best understood and modeled as AS
curve (or price) shocks.
· In the 1990s, many economists have recommended, and the central banks have generally followed, the goal of price stability – translated as a low rate of inflation – for monetary policy. There is a corresponding abandonment, or relegation to a subsidiary role, of the objective of maintaining a low unemployment rate.
It may be fair to say
that while monetary policy is recognized as having non-neutral effects in the short-run,
the long-run neutrality of money largely requires monetary policy to give
priority to achieving the long-run goal of price stability.
·
While the interest rate was historically the
operating target of monetary policy, a diversion to monetary targeting occurred
during the late 1970s under the impact of
See the Gilbert article on FED operating procedures in the 1970s and 1980s. Also, consider the origin of the macroeconomic disturbances prior to the 1970s and 1980s, during those two decades, and subsequent to them – were they AD or AS shocks, and what are the appropriate operating targets and strategies under those different circumstances?
· Most Western countries have reduced percentage reserve requirements on commercial banks to levels that are close to zero. Changes in these requirements have ceased to be a tool of monetary policy.
Not only for this
reason are they not a normal tool of policy, but in the past when reserve
requirements were higher or in force, they had potential to be an exceptionally
powerful tool – far too powerful for the typical magnitudes of necessary
monetary policy adjustment. (My “sledgehammer-to-drive-thumbtacks” analogy.)
· In the 1990s, the most common tools of monetary policy in developed economies are change in interest rates and open market operations.
The following three
items are in reference to selection of intermediate targets for monetary
policy:
While adoption of the goal of price stability lowers the inflation rate and its variability, it also increases the fluctuations in output and unemployment under supply shocks.
If the FED is trying
to keep the price level stable (a non-accommodative policy) as the economy is
subject to supply (or price) shocks, that policy creates greater fluctuations
in output and employment. They could
stabilize output with an accommodative policy, but then the inflation rate would
become volatile.
Successful interest rate targeting, in comparison with monetary targeting, increases the impact on aggregate demand of investment, net exports, fiscal deficits and other disturbances in the commodity markets while eliminating the impact of shocks emanating from the financial sectors.
If the FED is
targeting interest rates, then they are in effect creating a flat/horizontal LM
curve. As the goods (commodity) market
disturbances arise from consumption, investment, net exports, or fiscal sources
and the IS curve fluctuates, you will get bigger changes in AD – that is,
targeting interest rates provide pro-cyclical reinforcement to goods market
disturbances. On the other hand,
targeting interest rates isolates monetary and financial shocks from the real
economy – an example of counter-cyclical stabilization (if the LM curve would
shift one way, use monetary policy to counter or offset that shift and keep it
at the same interest rate intersection with the IS curve).
Monetary targeting eliminates the impact of fluctuations in the money supply induced by the private sector and moderates the impact of fluctuations emanating from the commodity market.
If the FED is
targeting the money stock, then goods market disturbances are mitigated
(limited) – it’s a counter-cyclical policy.
In effect, such a money stock targeting policy makes the LM curve
steeper. But the down-side is that if
the disturbances are coming from the money or financial markets, this targeting
policy is pro-cyclical.
The 1985 Gilbert article from the
You should be able to articulate the first two of the three (ignore the borrowed reserves targeting procedure) different operating procedures presented in the article. That is, explain how each operating procedure fit into the process of achieving the appropriate intermediate target (interest rates or money stock), how each procedure was implemented to achieve the operating target, and the consequences for interest rate and/or money stock fluctuations.
Here is a revised form of a test question I have used in the past (stochastic means unpredictable, random):
Gilbert's article (StLFRB's Economic
Review) presents and explains monetary policy operating procedures under two different
regimes:
1) targeting the federal funds rate,
such as was done during the 1970s (and since the mid-/late-1980s to the present);
and
2) targeting non-borrowed reserves, as was done
between October 1979 and October 1982.
Select ONE of these two procedures and explain how it is used to achieve
control of the intermediate target of money stock growth. Clearly identify the theoretical framework
for the procedure, the steps in the operating procedure in responding to a
stochastic increase in money (reserve) demand, and the advantages and disadvantages
in the procedure.