§45. The Outcome of the Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein, and the task of a Primordial Interpretation of this Entity.

1. First of all, it should be observed that this is a transitional chapter between Division I and Division II, and that is its main purpose: to make a clear and informative transition. This is accomplished primarily by identifying two problems or one problem that has two factors left over from Division I and proposing how these factors will be addressed (and resolved) in Division II.
   a. Thus the first thing Heidegger does is to summarize the accomplishments of Division I, which may be summarized in the interpretation of care as the Being of Dasein.

2. This leads to the questions of primordiality [Ursprünglichkeit=originally] of the interpretation thus achieved, and Heidegger explicates a primordial Interpretation not only according to what he has said about the fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception employed by any understanding, (§32) The primordiality of such an interpretation requires the securing of a grasp of the primordial unity of the structural whole of Dasein.

3. The two problems that arise here are the whole of Dasein, for we have seen it always as the not-yet of projection, and the authenticity of Dasein’s structure as care, for we have seen it only in undifferentiated or inauthentic modes.

4. Heidegger projects ahead that authentic Being-towards-death can allow us to grasp Dasein’s structural whole, and then the phenomenon of conscience, especially the existential wanting to have a conscience will allow us to grasp more(originarily) Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being. These both will become clear as modes of care, confirming the primordiality of our interpretation.

5. Heidegger goes on to trace the further structures of Temporality that will appear as themes in the later sections (some never finished).

DIVISION II, CHAPTER 1: DASEIN’S POSSIBILITY OF BEING-A-WHOLE AND BEING-TOWARDS-DEATH.

§46. The Seeming Impossibility of Getting Dasein’s Being-a-whole into Our Grasp Ontologically and Determining its Character.

1. Second ¶: “The possibility of being-a-whole is manifestly inconsistent with the ontological meaning of Care” Heidegger says.
   a. Dasein’s Being ahead-of-itself, with good examples, even hopelessness or being “ready for whatever may come” harbor the ahead of itself” as what underlies them and makes them possible. Hopelessness would mean nothing—without Dasein’s being ahead-of-itself.
   b. Dasein’s “not yet” as that which is still outstanding. (Later done more fully in §48).  
      i. slips from this to a potentiality not yet actualized.
ii. “something still to be settled”—or a constant inconclusiveness—for Dasein.

2. But if we eliminate this “not yet,” top 280, Dasein itself is annihilated. Paradox of our Being—it is only “whole” when it is “no longer Being.” This inability to experience the whole of Dasein is not some limitation of our intellects, but is part-and-parcel of our very Being.
   a. Is it thus hopeless to try to grasp Dasein’s “Being-a-whole”?
   b. No, we have slipped into considering Dasein as something present-at-hand from which some and especially one present-at-hand experience is still “lacking.”
   c. We need an existential analysis of Dasein and death.

3. Heidegger then outlines the plan for the chapter.

§47. The Possibility of Experiencing the Death of Others, and The Possibility of Getting a Whole Dasein into our Grasp.

1. Although this lead is a false one, it is “not nugatory” as Heidegger says. There is much interesting in the section, and even progress made, in the insight into Death as one’s “ownmost’ possibility.

2. Death of Others rendered more urgent or pressing (not “impressive!”) by
   a. Note the cautious subjunctives in ¶2: they hint that this approach might not work.
   b. First, Death is not a complete end, but leaves behind a corpse, a thing.
   c. Yet this misses the phenomenal content of death: corpse is not primarily a mere present-at-hand thing, but is something unalive—it still bears reference to Dasein.
      i. The reference to the anatomy student is accurate, but such treating of the corpse as a ready-to-hand entity does not give us particular insights that are helpful.

3. The Deceased vs. the Dead Person: The terms aren’t so much important as the actual difference in the way we can and do experience another’s death. Since we have Being-with, we still experience the death of an Other in terms of this Being-with, and still “are there with” in funeral rites, grieving, etc. This “Being-with” sense of the other who has died is what Heidegger refers to with the term “the deceased.” When people say of a relative or friend who has died, “She’s still with me everyday,” this only makes sense in terms of Dasein’s Being-with.
   a. The closer one is to the deceased, the more this Being-with is experienced phenomenally.
   b. The difficulty when someone close to you dies and you are not able to be present for all the Being-with of the grieving process—wake, funeral, late night talks with other friends and family, etc. This hints that part of what is really hurt or grieved in the death of another is our own “Being-with” that other person.
   c. Our funeral and mourning rites and rituals (both formal and informal) are an important testimony to the need to be gentle with our Being-with-the-Other. The loss of the other, which is not like losing a thing, is a loss of part of our own Being, since this is always in part Being-with.
   d. Note the important ¶ on “the world” in which we miss and grieve the deceased. We miss the Other in our everyday world of interactions where we were likely to encounter this Other—the lunch table where she usually sat, the stopping-by after church on
Sunday, the little bit of humor that we would always share with this now “missing” link. In other words, when we miss and grieve another person, we “encounter this loss” in the failure of all those connections and involvements—be they little or big—where this person’s Dasein-with figured in the “totality of signification” of our world.

i. I think that “world” eventually shifts and is transformed quite a bit, so that the “missing” of the deceased person becomes less and less “significant.” This doesn’t mean that we don’t care that the other has died, but that, as the world we go on living in takes further shape—a shape that is always one of significance formed around some possible “way of Being” to which Dasein assigns itself—the involvement of the other in this web of involvements gradually gets replaced by new involvements—at least most of the time.

ii. We “miss” the deceased in our concernful deals where he or she “is gone” and thus create new, even ritualized “concernful dealings” to “be with” the deceased and keep his or her memory “alive.”

4. But in this we precisely do not experience coming-to-an-end. Being-with goes on, albeit transformed. True, there is no Dasein-with in death, Heidegger suggests, for the whole experience of the loss takes place in the world of those who are left behind. We recognize this in popular chat about death: he’s beyond caring now.

a. We do speculate, “he’s looking down on us now and ‘is’ happy.” This still imagines the other still “in” our world. What are we doing here but supplying the Dasein-with that is so clearly at-an-end. But still, this is all imagined from our side, not the other’s.

b. See the last sentence of ¶H on 282: We don’t experience the dying of the Other, except by “being alongside” or, better, accompanying this dying—being involved without undergoing. There’s always that gap in accompanying the death of the other where we are just helplessly alongside.

c. But what we seek—the coming-to-an-end of Dasein’s Being—is manifestly missed in this.

5. The first suggestion is that this attempt to understand Dasein’s Being-a-totality through the death of others is a failure. The supposition that the death of the other could substitute for Dasein’s death was baseless, Heidegger concludes. However, this very impossibility of substitution or “representation” may itself be a positive insight derived from this analysis.

a. To a certain degree, Heidegger admits, Dasein can be represented by another Dasein as it goes about living its life. This substitution or “standing in for” works so long as another person can supply the place we play in the web of concernful dealings.

b. If the other is “cut to the measure of one’s occupation, one’s social status, or one’s age” Heidegger implies, such “representation” or standing-in-for can work.

c. But this only works in the context of concernful dealings. If an accountant is needed and another can fulfill my function as an accountant, the other represents me fine. The more generic this involvement is, the wider the range of potential substitutes there are. For example, if I need someone to help park cars for a football game, a person having the ability to stand and wear an orange vest and perform basic communications skills is all that’s needed. But if I am a neurosurgeon, there are few who can “pinch hit” for my Dasein.

d. “Here [in the world of concerns] Dasein can and must, within certain limits, ‘be’ another Dasein” (284).

6. But death is unlike this—“No one can take the Other’s dying away from him” (284).
a. One can sacrifice oneself for the other, throw one’s body in front of the speeding car, but here one still dies one’s own death, and this sacrifice does not make the other immortal—he is still left with his death to die.

b. The fantasy of the Greek myth of Alcestis, who dies for her husband Admetus by literally substituting for him when the Grim Reaper shows up at the door actually illustrates this impossibility instead of contradicting it, at least in Euripides’ tragedy that tells the story. For Admetus is left with his own (now shown to be very cowardly) existence once Alcestis has died. He will still die his own death one day. The most we can say is that she took his appointment with death, “for the time being” as we say, not his death itself.

c. Even if another dies for me, the other does not die my death. One can only substitute for another “in some definite affair”—an affair that is part of the concernful dealings in the world.

d. Thus, “death signifies a peculiar possibility-of-Being” for Dasein, and, in a very acute way, reveals the mineness of Dasein’s existence.

7. This insight reminds us that what we need here is an existential conception of death, and this existence, in which Dasein “has its own Being to be” (§3) precludes anything like a substitute means of inquiry or analysis.

8. There is a brief note on perishing at the bottom of p. 284. Heidegger reserves this term to signify the mere ending of life as an event that might befall any living entity—plant or animal. To discover how Dasein’s dying might be different requires precisely insight into an existential conception of death.

§48. That Which Is Still Outstanding; the End; Totality.

1. ¶B (the second ¶) of this section already announces that all of the modes of coming to an end explored here will be dead-ends: they are pertinent in some ways, but are ultimately “inappropriate” to Dasein and are to be rejected. Heidegger says that we seek not simply the rejection (dis-assignment) of such ways of coming-to-an-end, but a positive assignment, but this will depend on a correct orientation to Dasein’s state-of-Being. However, coming back to this task of reinterpreting these phenomena—totality, fulfillment, ending—does not remain part of Heidegger’s plan in this book or other writings.

2. Heidegger gives us three “theses” on 286, but I do not see these theses borne out in the subsequent analysis. They are rather a summary of what has been done so far (§§46-47): 1) the still-outstanding; 2) the no-longer-Dasein character of Death regarded as the coming-to-an-end of Dasein’s not-yet; and 3) non-representational or non-substitutional character of death: Dasein, in Being-towards-death, is irreplaceable.

3. Now Heidegger explores several modes of “coming-to-and-end” or Becoming-a-whole, all of which will be rejected as inappropriate to Dasein. These do not seem related to all three theses he just articulated; at best, they cover the first two points.

a. Being-a-whole by incorporating “what is still outstanding”: Being “outstanding” as a mode of “belonging to” is really a summative not-yetness; that is, what could and
perhaps should belong to an aggregate Being is “not yet” incorporated to the entity. This kind of not-Being-a-whole belongs to ready-to-hand entities, not Dasein-like entities. For example, one does not yet have the sum needed for the down payment, or one still owes on one’s student loans ten years after graduating because, after all, one was a philosophy major 😊.

i. What is still-outstanding is understood thus: “what belongs together is still not all together.” This pertains only to ready-to-hand type of entities (bottom 286).

ii. But Dasein is not such that what it is “not yet” is somehow a “piecing together” of parts that already exist each on its own. (As the money I must get is not yet mine? This is an incompletely thought through example, but the point is clear and beyond dispute: Dasein’s wholeness is not the piecing together of parts that are missing).

iii. The moon that is not yet full is another example here, where what is “not yet” is simply “not yet accessible.” Dasein’s not yet is not a problem of this kind.

b. Being-a-whole by becoming fulfilled: maturing into one’s Being.

i. At first, it seems that the fruit example might fulfill what we are seeking, because this pertains to a Being that has Becoming or Coming-to-be as part of its way-of-Being.

ii. The fruit goes towards its ripeness without adding on anything from outside itself.

iii. There is nothing “outstanding” in the ripening; simply a process that has not yet come to “fruition” or to completeness.

1) The sum that is not-yet-complete is “indifferent” to what is still outstanding, but the fruit strives toward its completion/perfection.

iv. Great characterization: the fruit itself “is that unripeness as it ripens.” This is brilliant, for Dasein too always is its not-yet. However, the comparison fails.

1) Ripeness as an end is fulfillment, but Death is not the fulfillment of Dasein.

2) Although death is the fulfillment of Dasein in one sense, its possibilities in death are precisely not fulfilled—and we see this especially in the death of one who dies young (give example of Sam Keaveny)—but left unfulfilled.

3) “Even ‘unfulfilled’ Dasein ends.” As brilliant as was Heidegger’s observation that Dasein, like the piece of fruit, is its not yet, this new insight undoes that one. Dasein does not become a whole as the fruit does.

4) Sober realization: “For the most part, Dasein ends in unfulfillment, or else by having disintegrated and been used up” (288).

c. Coming-to-be-a-whole as “coming to a ‘stop’ or an ‘end.’” Death as an ending could be seen as the way something “stops” the rain stops; a road stops.

i. But when the rain stops, it is no longer present-at-hand (nor ready-to-hand). When the rain stops it simply ceases to be completely.

ii. When the road stops, it is complete as the road it is, but this means either it a) is truncated (left unfinished) or b) completed (finished), as the painting that is finished with the last brushstroke.

iii. But these are both modes of being-a-whole that belong to the ready-to-hand.

iv. Likewise the “disappearing” mode of coming to an end pertains to readiness-to-hand.

4. Last two complete ¶¶ on 289: Dasein does not, in dying, come to an end in any of these ways. Rather, Dasein is already its not-yet in the way that it is always “towards-its-end”; thus, Dasein’s way of Being-a-whole will be Being-towards-death. Very pointed quotation
of a proverb: “As soon as a man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die” (289, cited from Berndt and Burdach, apparently in a folktale). The point of the proverb is that Bein-gtowards-death is always a way in which Dasein is; whenever and wherever Dasein is or exists, it is towards-its-death.

a. Need to turn to an existential way of characterizing Dasein’s Becoming-a-whole.

b. “The end towards which Dasein is as existing, remains inappropriately defined by the notion of a “Being-at-an-end” (290).

§49. How the Existential Analysis of Death is Distinguished from Other Possible Interpretations of the Phenomenon

1. These are largely observations that need not concern us. Heidegger further distinguishes here his interest from a biological definition of death (perishing).

2. We are interested in death as a possibility for Dasein’s very being, not as a factual state.


1. The section starts with a review, including care’s three-fold structure. The definition of death developed in this section will be shown to be grounded in care.

2. Death is something impending— looming or “standing before us.” The not-yet character of death “looms up before us.” (I will usually use “loom” in place of “impend” here; in the text of B & T, the translators speak of things that impend or stand before us).

a. Yet, other kinds of possibilities-for-being loom all the time. The thunderstorm looms, the test looms, the end of the school year looms, your trip to Europe looms, or on Monday morning the whole work week looms. The visit of your friend who is coming for Pinestock weekend looms. What is distinctive about Death as it looms?

b. Heidegger divides the looming into things not-like-Dasein (storm, test, arrival of a friend) and possibilities that are cut to the measure of Dasein itself: a way for it to be. Being-towards-death is more like this, for it is a distinctive possibility for Dasein in its Being.

c. But with death, Dasein’s ownmost possibility or potentiality-for-Being looms or stands before Dasein. Death is the possibility of “no-longer-being-able to be there” or, since “being there” is D-a-sein, of no-longer-being-able-to-be-Dasein.

i. Thus, Dasein stands before itself in a particularly apposite way: with what it distinctively is in its own right at stake. He says it has been “fully assigned” to this ownmost potentiality-for-Being.

ii. Heidegger then claims (without a lot of argument) that all relations with other Dasein have been “dissolved” (perhaps a better word than the “undone” that the translators give us, although that is not wrong. But the German lösen [or here, gelöst] is related to “loosen” and so has the sense of being set free from relations or detached from them, which “dissolve” seems to express.

3. Existential definition of death on bottom of 294: Death is: 1) one’s ownmost possibility, non-relational, and which is not-to-be-outstripped.
a. Thus, death is not just impending or looming, but is so distinctively. None of the other possibilities that impend or stand before us have these three characteristics.
b. Note that this analysis of "impending" or "looming" took its point of departure from the "A head-of-itself" character of Dasein as care. Heidegger will now trace out the existential definition in the other aspects of care: Being-already-in or thrownness, and Being-alongside or falling.

4. Dasein has always already been thrown into death, or at least thrown into mortality. it has been delivered over to this ownmost possibility in its very existence.
a. This is revealed not as knowledge or as theory about death, but by mood—the mood of anxiety.
b. In this anxiety-in-the-face-of-death we do not see some morbid tendency or a weakness of character, but the disclosure that Dasein already is "being-towards-its-end."

5. This anxiety leads to a fleeing-in-the-face-of-loomig-death: That many seem unaware of death does not mean that thrownness-into-death disclosed as anxiety-in-the-face-of-death is false, but testifies to the everyday mode of evasion by falling as fleeing-in-the-face-of-death.
a. Read Tolstoy's reflection from A Confession on the white and black mouse that gnaw away at the plant by which the traveler hangs over the abyss: yet he distracts himself by licking the honey off the leaves of the plant. This is the perfect image of what Heidegger is discussing here.

6. This existential definition of death is clearly grounded in care, and thus is appropriate to Dasein, unlike the other ways of looking at death as an end: "As regards its ontological possibility, dying is grounded in care" (296).

§51. Being-towards-Death and the Everydayness of Dasein.

1. This should not be all that difficult. Here are main elements:
a. The "they" and idle talk about death.
b. A "case of death" or an "instance of death": someone dies.
c. Who seems to die is this indefinite "someone"—Das Man, the "they." Who dies is "somebody" as "nobody"—nobody in particular. Look at Ivan Ilych's syllogism in Tolstoy's The Death of Iván Ilých (nb Heidegger footnotes this on 298, end of 1st ¶.) The syllogism he had learnt from Kiesewetter's Logic: "Caius is a man, men are mortal, therefore Caius is mortal," had always seemed to him correct as applied to Caius, but certainly not as applied to himself. That Caius—man in the abstract—was mortal, was perfectly correct, but he was not Caius, not an abstract man, but a creature quite, quite separate from all others. He had been little Vántya, with a mamma and a papa, with Mitya and Volódya, with the toys, a coachman and a nurse, afterwards with Kátenka and will all the joys, griefs, and delights of childhood, boyhood, and youth. What did Caius know of the smell of that striped leather ball Vántya had been so fond of? Had Caius kissed his mother's hand like that, and did the silk of her dress rustle so for Caius? Had he rioted like that at school when the pastry was bad? Had Caius been in love like that? Could Caius preside at a session as he did? "Caius
really was mortal, and it was right for him to die; but for me, little Ványa, Iván Ilých, with all my thoughts and emotions, it's altogether a different matter. It cannot be that I ought to die. That would be too terrible.”

Such was his feeling.

“If I had to die like Caius I would have known it was so. An inner voice would have told me so, but there was nothing of the sort in me and I and all my friends felt that our case was quite different from that of Caius. And now here it is!” he said to himself. “It can't be. It's impossible! But here it is. How is this? How is one to understand it?”

He could not understand it, and tried to drive this false, incorrect, morbid thought away and to replace it by other proper and healthy thoughts. But that thought, and not the thought only but the reality itself, seemed to come and confront him. (Tolstoy, The Death of Iván Ilých, http://www.ccel.org/)

i. Death is taken as a public occurrence—not “my very own.” In taking Death as something actual that occurs here or there, one covers up death as an imminent possibility.

ii. temptation; tranquillization: read from the beginning of “The Death of Iván Ilých” page 1 or page 3, where Schwartz intimates to Peter Ivánovich that they should get out of here and go and play cards. The point is that we are constantly tempted in our everyday way of Being-towards-death to tranquillize ourselves with distractions of concerns in the world, and these reassure us effectively of our very Being-in-the-world.

d. One is also “taught” how to comport oneself in the face of death, and precisely in such a way that it is not authentically faced: the “they” does not afford us the courage to have true “anxiety in the face of death.”

i. The they transforms the anxiety in the face of death that reveals authentic Being-towards-death as mere fear in the face of an (unlikely) event.

ii. One is even taught indifference about the “fact that one dies.”

iii. “Yes, death has occurred, again, but we, at any rate, are still alive”: this is the feeling Heidegger says one inevitably feels in an experience of the death of another—in our everyday experience of death.

2. Yet even this everyday fleeing-in-the-face-of-death reveals, if properly understood, that death is still an issue, an issue from which we hide and distract ourselves.

§52. Everyday Being-towards-death and the Full Existential Conception of Death.

1. The second ¶ shifts the discussion from the covering-up of the “they” to certainty—but what kind of certainty?

a. First of all, Heidegger analyzes what “certainty” means in general.

b. certainty as “Being in truth” i.e., Being-in unconcealedness of Death as Dasein's ownmost possibility, non-relational and not-to-be-outstripped.

c. One must have conviction (Überzeugung) by remaining faithful to the phenomenon itself as it has been disclosed.
2. Dasein’s normal kind of “certainty” of death is not doubting death—we don’t doubt that
death is a reality and even an eventuality—but Being-certain in a way of not-holding-for-
true or not maintaining oneself in the unconcealedness of death.
   a. Death as a fact of experience is inadequate, for the “fact of experience” does not hold
unconcealed Dasein as Being-towards.
   b. The empirical certainty of death as an event is inadequate. When one says “Death is
certain,” one gets the impression that one’s own death is certain, which it is not—at
least not in this consciousness of it.
   c. We need a Dasein-like way of certainty—bottom 301.
   d. Even the evasion of death—or of the thought of death—testifies in a way to a different
kind of certainty than empirical certainty.
   e. When one says “Death comes, but not right away—not now, at least,” death’s
imminence, or its possibility at any moment is covered up.: The definiteness or certainty
of death as a possibility gets covered up by the indefiniteness of its when.
      i. Heidegger says we confer a definiteness on this indefiniteness. Not by saying “this
is when” but by saying that the indefiniteness means “not now,” that it definitely
means “somewhere down the road.” Death is looked upon as a future event that is
certain but definitely “not now.”

3. Need to look to one’s Being-towards this end: the end does not come only in one’s
demise, although we fool ourselves into thinking that it is so.
   a. We need to take over the “not yet” from Dasein’s own “ahead-of-itself”—not from non-
Dasein kinds of incompleteness.
   b. Dasein is always factically dying insofar as it is Being-towards-its-death.
   c. Can Dasein understand authentically its ownmost possibility of dying?

§53. Existential Projection of an Authentic Being-towards-death

1. Good Q’s in 1st ¶, which fundamentally introduces the question of how a possible
authentic Being-towards-death might be characterized ontologically.
   a. Although these may seem like rhetorical questions, Heidegger really answers them in
what follows.
   b. Second ¶ in section is a strategic plan for the section: we will use our full “existential
conception” of death, which I have called the existential definition.

2. The following ¶¶, starting with the one at the bottom of 304 (¶c), lay out how we can stay
faithful to both Dasein’s constitution and the existential definition of death : Authentic
Being-towards-death must stay in the disclosedness of what we have seen as the
existential conception of death: ownmost, non-relational, not-to-be-outstripped, yet
indefinite (possible at any moment).
   a. How is the “Being towards” of Being-towards-death to be understood? Can we
understand it along the lines of Being-out-for...? Heidegger examines various ways we
can be “out for” some goal and concern ourselves with intermediary actualization:
making things attainable, controllable, practicable, etc.
      i. But this is no solution. This process of “being out for” always looks to a further in-
order-to.
      ii. But there is no question of such a dynamic of actualization in Being-towards-
death. How could there be? Actualizing death would not be a Being-towards-
death but a bringing about one’s demise—the end of Dasein.
b. Also **not a brooding or “dwelling upon death” as a possibility.** Heidegger argues that brooding or pondering death strips form it a little its character as possibility. But, he says, it is precisely this that must be maintained in authentic Being-towards-death: Dasein must abide with death **as a possibility.**

c. Authentic Being-towards-death is **not expectation or awaiting** of death either: these would be just awaiting the actualization and fall under the same critique as those modes.

3. **Instead, vorlaufen: anticipation as running-ahead-of-itself-towards-death.**
   a. Note footnote: running-ahead does NOT mean “rushing headlong into death.”
   b. Heidegger sees such a way of being not as a actualization, but a coming closer understandingly (with clear sight!) to the possibility as possibility. The fact that this is not an actualization but a clear-sighted “understanding penetration” into the possibility of death as the “possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all” (307). Death is “set free” as possibility in such **anticipation.** I do not rest on something actual instead of death, but see death clearly as the possibility of impossibility and face this.
   c. This anticipation is consistent with Dasein’s very being as “ahead-of-itself” as anticipation or existence (307). This allows us to see the possibility of authenticity, for it is its own character as existence, not as presence-at-hand or readiness-to-hand that Dasein encounters in Being-towards-death as anticipation.

4. What follows is a step-by-step analysis of the existential conception of death in terms of the authenticity achieved in anticipation. The point is to examine how each element is
   a. ¶j (307): death as one’s **ownmost possibility.** In anticipation of death one is “wrenched free of the ‘they’”; this factor allows one to see that one is normally enmeshed in this same “they”: “This only reveals one’s factual lostness in the everydayness of the they-self” (307). in other words, anticipation affords one insight into the everyday mode, which else might be as unnoticeable as the air we breathe.
   b. ¶k (308) **Non-relationality:** anticipation sees death as the possibility that must be assumed (taken over or “taken up”) by Dasein alone.
      i. Death doesn’t just belong to one’s being as the end that will come, but it **lays claim to** one’s individual existence.
      ii. Dasein sees (which means understands), in anticipation, the ultimate failure of all being-alongside and all being-with.
      iii. Yet, this is not a complete rejection, Heidegger says, of Being with. One can only show authentic solicitude, he says, if one projects oneself upon one’s ownmost possibility rather than upon the possibilities of the they-self. We will see that Being-with also emerges in the next element, where the realization that one’s possibilities as Being-in-the-world are finite allows one an understanding of others having possibilities beyond my own involvement with them.
   c. ¶l: (308) **not-to-be-outstripped.** Anticipation sees the possibility of death clearly not by surrendering or abandoning all other possibilities, but by seeing them all “lying before”—i.e., “in front of”—death as the ultimate and ownmost possibility.
      i. In authentic anticipation of Being-towards-death as **not to be outstripped,** one’s possibilities are understood as **finite**—that is, as lying before its uttermost possibility—which is the impossibility of being in any way at all. Understood as finite, these possibilities are given back to Dasein in a more authentic way—it is no longer lost in them, for it sees their finitude.
ii. This process actually frees the possibilities of Others as well insofar as Dasein is here given some understanding of the potentiality-for-Being of Others (309). In seeing its own possibilities as clearly finite, Dasein is more free to surrender some possibilities to others, to renounce the utter and infinite control of all the possibilities it sees.

iii. This anticipatory understanding that death is not to be outstripped includes the possibility of Dasein’s existing as a whole potentiality-for-Being. Note that this is not a whole as a fact, but as a potentiality-for-Being.

d. ¶m-n (pp. 309-10): death’s certainty. In anticipating death authentically, Dasein dwells in the truth (unconcealedness) of death. It is not certain of death as a fact, but is certain of Being-in-the-world as a finite existence towards death.

e. ¶o (310): indefiniteness (310). This element of the anticipatory authenticity of Being-towards-death is “cultivated.” Heidegger says, with the certainty of death in anxiety. The “threat” arising out of Dasein’s own “there” is experienced in anxiety, in which “Dasein finds itself face-to-face with the ‘nothing’ of the possible impossibility of its existence” (310). This anxiety about the “nothingness” upon which one’s Being-there is founded is, Heidegger says, what Being-towards-death “essentially” is.

5. The summary of this is on page 311: “anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being, rather in an impassioned FREEDOM TOWARDS DEATH—a freedom which has been released from the illusions of the ‘they’ and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious.”

a. What should be added, perhaps where Heidegger has “factual,” is the finitude of Dasein’s existence that is understood in authentic Being-towards-death. I even wonder if this is not a typo, since in the section the finitude that is realized in authentic anticipating death as that possibility which is not to be outstripped comes right before certainty and anxiety. This finitude that is realized in authentic anticipation is a crucial and important insight and by rights should be part of this summary.

b. Heidegger says that we have now glimpsed the ontological possibility of Dasein’s being-a-whole and doing so authentically, but we need to see this “attested” in an ontical potentiality-for-Being of Dasein, which will be the phenomenon of conscience.